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THE SCHOLASTIC CONCEPT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
N view of the present international situation, which comes
very close to resembling the Hobbesian hypothetical
"state of nature" wherein there was neither law nor right, a
discussion of International Law might irritate the cynically-
minded because of its apparent naivete and innocence in face
of reality. Because so many nations have performed acts
evidently contrary to the "rules" of what we call Interna-
tional Law, because these violations of the International
code have been so frequent, it is little wonder that the aver-
age person has long begun to doubt the existence of a law
for nations, in the proper sense of the term "law." He be-
gins by asking himself: "Who passed such a law?"; "Who
enforces it?"; "What are its sanctions?". And he concludes
that it must be merely a gentleman's agreement, which goes
by the board any time a particular nation does not feel in a
gentlemanly mood.
For the Scholastic philosopher, however, International
Law is truly a law, and is as firmly grounded in fundamental
principles as is the civil law of any individual state. He ad-
mits that the frequent violation of such a law is a dishearten-
ing -thing, but he recognizes that these violations cannot de-
stroy its real existence and fundamental nature.
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GENERAL CONCEPT OF LAw
In order to discuss intelligently the particular kind of law
known as International Law, it is necessary to determine the
Scholastic conception of law as such, the essence of law in
general. The term "law" is used in reference to things hav-
ing essentially different natures. Thus, we speak of the
laws which govern the movements of the heavenly bodies;
the laws of gravitation, electricity, affinity, cohesion, etc.,
which dominate the activities of physical bodies; the bio-
logical laws of nutrition, growth, and reproduction in or-
ganic life; the psychological laws manifest in the opera-
tions of the mind. In the social sciences we discuss laws
operating in the realms of sociology and economics. The
logician and the artist are aware of the laws which must be
followed in order to attain the end of their activities. All of
us are aware, of course, of the existence of the civil 'law and
of its general nature. Finally, most of us admit the existence
of what we call the moral law and are conscious of its direc-
tive force in human activity.
It is obvious that the term "law" is not used in relation
to all of these spheres in an univocal sense. The term, how-
ever, does signify a concept which carries a certain note of
meaning that is common to each of the usages mentioned
above. This common note undoubtedly is that law is a rule
of action. It is an ordering of the activities of a thing. Fur-
ther, since an action that has no particular direction is unin-
telligible and a real impossibility, the law which directs the
actions of a particular thing must point to an end, a final
cause of those actions. We can, therefore, add to our initial
definition by saying that a law is a rule of action, directive
of an agent to its proper end.
So, whether we are considering the mineral level, the plant
level, the animal level, or the human level, we encounter
reality as essentially dynamic, as acting, and in this universal
activity as obeying certain rules of order which we call laws.
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Moreover, unless we are willing to admit that all action is
purposeless, we will have to grant that every agent, either
consciously as a man, or unconsciously as a sub-human be-
ing, always acts for a purpose, an end. In its widest sense,
therefore, a law is nothing more than a manner of acting in
a way which will lead the agent to the end porportionate to
its nature, the particular law followed by each agent like-
wise being determined by that agent's particular 'nature. In
short, every agent, lacking from the outset the full perfec-
tion of its nature, seeks to overcome this initial deficiency
by a series of acts which will lead it to the desired end
wherein it will achieve the perfection due its nature. These
acts, therefore, are the means to that end; and law, in its
widest sense, is that which puts order into these acts whereby
they will be duly proportionate to the end for which they
are intended. "It is an ordination of things to an end, by
reason of which each creature by pursuing its own particular
end, helps to attain the end of the whole universe."'
THE ETERNAL LAw
This universal manifestation of law surely leads us to the
recognition of a Lawgiver for the universe. For it is obvious
that beings below man lack the intelligence either to deter-
mine for themselves an end of action or to direct themselves
to that end by the proper choice of means. Yet, they do act
purposefully; and hence, they must be directed by an In-
telligent Being, who has implanted the law within their
very natures. Even man, who possesses intelligence and the
power of self-direction, recognizes that he is not perfectly
autonomous and that he too is under the control of law.
For he is aware of the fact that not only does he necessarily
obey the physical laws which govern all corporeal substances,
but that his reason discovers certain laws of conduct which
he feels obliged to follow freely as a man. In both cases he
1 GREiD, J., ELEMENTA PnnsoPHIAE, Vol. II, p. 275.
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recognizes that these laws are not of his own making, but are
imposed upon him. Scholastics call this general law of the
universe, this fundamental plan of action for all creatures,
the Eternal Law. They reason that the Creator of the uni-
verse, Who is supremely intelligent, must have created for a
purpose, and in order that that purpose will be accomplished,
He must have instituted a plan of action for the universe, a
law. Thus, in the words of St. Thomas, the Eternal Law is
"the Divine Wisdom in so far as it is directive of all actions
and movements." 2 Every particular law of the universe,
therefore, is but a manifestation of the Divine Plan by which
the whole universe is directed to its end.
THE NATURAL LAW
Although the Eternal Law is thus universal in its exten-
sion, it does not bind all creatures in precisely the same way.
As stated before, the action of a being follows the nature of
that being, and consequently the nature of the being will
determine its manner of obeying the law. In general, we
might say that all things below man obey the law with
physical necessity, that is, they always and unfailingly act
in conformity with the law of their natures. That portion
of the Eternal Law, therefore, which applies to creatures
devoid of Intelligence and Will, we call Physical Law. But
when we come to the human level, we are confronted with
an entirely different situation. Here, the Eternal Law, al-
though just as obligatory as it is on the sub-human levels,
binds in another way, - in a way, again, consonant with
human nature. For man, possessing the specific perfection
of ratioflality, is capable of both knowing the Eternal Law
and of determining himself to follow it. He, therefore, is not
constrained to observe the Eternal Law by physical neces-
sity, but rather by moral necessity. We call man's portion
of the Eternal Law the Natural Law or the Moral Law, and
2 AQUiNAS, ST. THons, SSumA THOLOGICA, I-II, q. 93, a. 1.
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define it as "the participation of the Eternal Law in ra-
tional creatures, the light of reason, as it were, by which
we discern what is good and what is evil." The Natural
Law is an intellectual participation in the Eternal Law,
rather than a "natural" participation as is found in the
tendencies and inclinations of irrational creatures. By rea-
son of this participation a man apprehends the fundamental
precepts of moral action, which are his guides in conduct.
PRECEPTS OF THE NATURAL LAW
Common sense testifies to the philosopher's analysis of
the "good" as that which is desirable. Just as the apprehen-
sion of reality as intelligible is the first principle of the ac-
tivity of the speculative intellect, so the apprehension of
reality as desirable is the first principle of the practical in-
tellect, that is, the intellect as engaged in directing human
actions. By reflecting on the nature of his various appetites
and inclinations, man sees that they are always ordinated
to reality as desirable or good, to objects that are beneficial
to and perfective of these appetites. From this analysis, it
is an easy inference to apprehend the first precept of the
natural law: Good is to be done, and evil is to be avoided.
In short, the good is that which is the object of an appetite.
The evil is that which is contrary to the inclination of an
appetite. By his reason man can become aware of his natural
appetites and inclinations and the objects to which they are
ordinated. Since these natural inclinations are manifestive
of the Eternal Law of the Divine Reason which "directs all
things to their ultimate end, man can easily recognize the
truth of this primary precept, which implies that whatever
is in conformity with a natural inclination is good, and
whatever frustrates or hinders a natural inclination is evil,
- recognizing at the same time that there is an order among
his appetites and faculties, and that the lower must be main-
tained in their natural state of subordination to the higher.
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Following St. Thomas we can make a general classification
of these natural inclinations in man, and the general pre-
cepts of the natural law which are based on them:
a. Inclinations arising from man as a substance: self-
preservation and conservation in existence. Precepts which
forbid self-destruction, self-mutilation, etc.
b. Inclinations arising from man as an animal: conserva-
tion of the species through generation; care of children.
Precepts regarding marriage, birth-control, education of
children, etc.
c. Inclinations arising from man as rational: knowledge
of truth, life in society: Precepts regarding social justice and
charity.'
All of these inclinations, organic, sensory, and rational,
in so far as they are regulated by reason, are ordinated to
good ends; and from these natural inclinations can be de-
duced the fundamental rights and duties belonging to man.
Briefly, he has the right to the goods specified by his natural
inclinations, (as regulated by right reason), and the duty to
respect these same rights in other men.
PROPERTIES OF THE NATURAL LAW
It is because the natural law is grounded in the very es-
sence or nature of man and upon the essential relations
which his natural inclinations have to their objects, that we
ascribe the following properties to it:
a. It is Universal both in the sense that it is co-extensive
with mankind, and in the sense that it is universally know-
able to all men. Since all men possess the same nature, the
law of that nature is binding upon each of them. No one,
likewise, can deny that the primary precepts of that law have
always and everywhere been recognized by men; even
though a few degraded tribes have erred in the application
of its secondary and more remote precepts.
3 Ibid., q. 94, a. 2.
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b. It is Unchangeable. This property again follows from
the fact that it is based on the essences of things and their
essential relationships. Just as there is an unchanging and es-
sential relationship, say between the radius of a circle and
its circumference, so there is an equally unchanging and
essential relationship existing between man and God, be-
tween man and his fellow-man, between the faculties of man
and the ends for which they are designed. These relation-
ships are just as unchanging as the natures which they relate.
They are founded on the real, objective order of things,
which remains as it is in spite of any arbitrary perversion of
that order on the part of individual human acts, or social
custom, or even by an unjust human positive law.
c. It binds with an absolute necessity. Because perfect
happiness is the ultimate subjective end for all men, they
cannot help but always to act in view of that end. Because
this is a necessary end, the adoption of the means leading
to it becomes equally necessary; and hence, the Natural
Law, which guides us in the choice of those means, obliges
with an unconditional or absolute necessity. In other words,
the necessity of the means merely reflects the necessity of
the end.
Such, in brief, is the Scholastic conception of law in gen-
eral, and of the Natural Law in particular. The recognition
of the existence of a natural law that is an objective, uni-
versal, and immutable rule of conduct for all mankind has
not only been an integral part of traditional Christian cul-
ture, but was explicitly acknowledged by the best thinkers
of pagan Greece and Rome. This existence of a natural law
is expressed by Aristotle in his division of law into particular
and universal: "Particular law is that which each commu-
nity lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly
written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of
nature. For there really is, as every one to some extent di-
vines a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all
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men, even on those who have no association or covenant with
each other." ' Here Aristotle speaks of the existence of the
natural law, describes it as universal and obligatory, and
recognizes it as something quite distinct from the civil law
and from individual human contracts. This conception of
the natural law was perfected by Christian thinkers, who
with the aid of revealed truth showed its relation to the
Eternal Law of God and how its temporal sanctions are
completed by the perfect sanctions of the next life. This
traditional conception of the Natural Law is the basis for
our appraisal of human positive law, both national and
international.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Because, as we have seen, man has a natural inclination
expressive of his need and aptitude for group living, society
is natural to him and to that extent the state is a natural
institution. Neither as an individual nor as a member of
the family can man "live well," can he attain even the im-
perfect happiness possible in his temporal life. He requires
the aids given by civil society in order .to develop completely
the virtues of his rational and moral nature. Hence the state
owes its existence to the Natural Law. Further, since the
state must have a ruler and laws by which the actions of
its members are directed to the common good, it is evident
that these necessary political elements are likewise justified
by the Natural Law. Civil laws, therefore, owe their ultimate
"legality" to the Natural Law, in as much as they are the
necessary means by which men can live together in society.
The civil law contains two kinds of precepts: (1) Those
which are identical with the precepts of the natural law,
e.g., those forbidding murder, theft, etc.; (2) Those which
are a more specific and explicit determination of precepts
which exist in the natural law in only a general and implicit
4 ARmsToTLE, RHLrORICA, I, 13, 1373b, 3. (Oxford.)
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way, - the bulk of detailed laws passed by an individual
state in reference to its particular institutions and practices.
It is evident from this relationship between the civil law
and the natural law that the justice of a civil law is deter-
mined by its conformity with the natural law, and the ob-
ligation to obey it arises from this same relationship. Con-
versely, it is evident that a civil law commanding or forbid-
ding an action contrary to the natural law is not truly a law,
but in the words of St. Thomas "an act of violence."
Man's natural bond to his felow-man, however, does not
disappear at the boundaries of each man's particular state,
but rather it is co-extensive with all human society. The
fundamental precepts of justice and charity, of mutual aid
and respect for the rights of others, obtain just as truly
among men of different states as among men of the same
state. Consequently, the same intimate relationship which
exists between the domestic civil law and the natural law
also exists between International Law and the natural, law.
We may define the law of nations as "the sum total of
the duties and rights, customs and usages, by which states
are bound together in their dealings with one another. Like
the domestic laws of nations, it contains two elements: Nat-
ural and Positive. The former comprises those principles
and rules governing international relations which are im-
mediately drawn from the moral law of nature written there
by its Creator. The posftive element consists mainly of
treaties, customs and usages which the states 'have formally
accepted or sanctioned. In so far as accepted international
law does not include pertinent precepts of the natural law,
... it falls short of completeness; in so far as it contains
articles contrary to the precepts of the natural law, it loses
all binding force and frustrates its own purpose." '
It is evident, therefore, that our conception of Interna-
tional Law is opposed radically to that too current opinion
5 RyAw, J. A., INTERNATIONAL ETmcs, p. 4.
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which regards the 'law of nations, and in fact all positive law,
as merely .a more or less arbitrary code of rules, having only
that binding force that can be imposed by external compul-
sion. Rather, we maintain that all positive law, both domes-
tic and international, that coincides with the fundamental
principles of the natural law, is absolutely binding in con-
science with a moral obligation, - regardless of whether
or not there happens to be on hand a physical force capable
of enforcing its observation.
Our conception of the natural law as the underlying rule
of conduct for all men is also the basis for our position that
certain acts are good or bad in themselves, irrespective of
the particular consequences which might follow their per-
formance. For instance, murder, theft, and lying are forbid-
den both by natural and by positive law because men rec-
ognize that these acts are contrary to the natural order of
things. We know that these acts are bad in themselves, and
would be so even if the state should not have positive laws
forbidding them. This is what we mean by objective, intrinsic
morality; a morality that is not based on immediate con-
sequences, or pragmatic expediency, or subjective impulses,
but rather is one that is buried in the real, unchanging na-
tures of things. One, therefore, that is above not only the
individual, but also above any collection of individuals in
the form of the state, regardless of its physical might.
There are those who claim that international law is not
really law in the proper sense, since it lacks an authority
which can impose its rules upon the community of nations.
This position is indeed a perfectly logical one to those who
deny the existence and binding power of the natural law,
which has as its authority God.fHimself, the Author of all
nature; and who also regard the State as an end in itself, an
absolute entity than which there is no higher authority. But
to the Scholastic, who sees the State as. constituted of in-
dividual men for whose common welfare it exists, the idea
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of that state being superior to the moral law appears as a
monstrous contradiction. For the state is just as much a
moral being as are the members which constitute it, and as
an organization of individual men it has the same obligations
under the natural law as do these men as individuals. Fur-
ther, the Scholastic philosopher, recognizing the fact that
all authority ultimately comes from the Supreme Lawgiver
for the universe, sees no difficulty in acknowledging the
validity of international law, even though it may not have at
present a human authority instituted by the community of
nations. "The natural law is the law which prescribes the
things that are necessary for our human natural perfection,
and it includes every kind of natural necessity; necessities
of mind and of body, the things necessary for each man per-
sonally,, and the things necessary in our dealings with one
another, the state, which is a necessity of nature, and the
necessary relations of states. Thus, international law, which
prescribes the things necessary for states in their mutual re-
lations and dealings, is nothing more than a part of the
moral law, and must be regarded as governed by moral con-
siderations." C
Not only is it evident that the moral law furnishes the
natural element in international law, but a little considera-
tion will make it clear that even the positive element
(treaties, pacts, covenants, etc.) would have no binding force
unless the various states recognized that there was a moral
obligation under the natural law to keep faith with one
another.
PRECEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
On the basis of the above general principles, let us out-
line a few specific precepts of the natural law governing
international relations: firstly, those grouped under Justice,
and secondly, those under Charity.
6 CRONDN, ScONcE oF ErTucs, Vol. II, p. 639.
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a. Justice between individuals is based on the natural
equality of al" individuals as men, who are naturally equal
because they have the same natural final end. Because no
man is the means to the accomplishment of another man's
end, no man may lawfully interfere with another or with
his property, or treat another as a means to himself or his
own convenience by attempting to exercise control over that
other, or by interfering with his freedom in any way. In the
same way, each state is juridically the equal of every other,
since all states have the same end, that is, to promote the
welfare of their peoples. Each state is a moral person, sov-
ereign and independent, deriving its jurisdiction from its
own nature and the Author of nature, and not from any
other state. No state, therefore, is subordinate to another
or may be treated as subordinate. From this juridical equal-
ity arise three chief rights in justice enjoyed by every state:
1. The right of existence and self-preservation. This
right includes the rights of independence, integrity, and
peaceable existence, to safeguard which the state has the
right to wage war and the right to equip itself remotely for
war. It is obvious that in so exercising these rights, the state
cannot injure the rights of other states.
2. The right of property. This right includes both the
property of its citizens and state-owned property, including
its own territory. Without going into detail regarding this
right, we might state briefly that the state can set up prop-
erty in territory not owned by another state. This is usually
signified by the two acts of annexation and settlement; and
the extent of the land claimed must be only that amount
that the state is able to control. In regard to the occupancy
of territory already occupied by uncivilized races some dis-
tinctions must be made: (1) Territory merely over-run by
nomadic tribes is considered unoccupied and may be taken
over by any organized state. (2) Territory occupied by an
uncivilized people having no economic or juridical organ-
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ization may be taken over by the civilized, organized state,
but the private property rights of the inhabitants must he
recognized. (3) A community, even though uncivilized, which
possesses an organization sufficient for other states to enter
into public relations with it, may not be lawfully occupied."
Scott describes the traditional Scholastic position on this
matter as follows: "For both Vitoria and, later, Suarez the
Jesuit, the essence of the system of international law was
equality among nations as among individuals. In regard to
imperfect communities which were not in a position to organ-
ize themselves in such a way as to protect their own inter-
ests, they maintained that a responsibility for such imperfect
communities lay with more advanced peoples, and they
charged the latter with the task of assisting the backward
states to a position in which they would be able to look after
their own welfare and interest. The world has recently re-
discovered that doctrine and christened it the mandate"...8
3. The right of free action. Under this general right are
included the rights of self-development; to make treaties
without interference from other states (unless some right
possessed by those states has been infringed); to expand,
even though, by such action, it becomes a rival to other states
in commerce or military power. In short, every state has the
right to full and free development of its own powers, provid-
ed that no actual aggression is committed against other
states.
7 It may be mentioned here that it was on the occasion of the Spanish dis-
coveries in the New World that the Dominican, Francisco do .Vitoria, wrote his
two famous treatises, "On the Indians" and "On the Law of War," which arie now
considered to be the first formulation of the modem law of nations, being recog-
nized as such in 1933 by a resolution of the Seventh International Conference of
American States. In these works, Vitoria claimed that the Indians were true owners
of their territory, and that the only possible titles by which the Spaniards could
lawfully subjugate them would be the refusal of the Indians to allow natural
travel and communication and the carrying on of commerce in goods necessary
for good living; or the desire on the part of the majority of the converted Indians
for a Christian ruler; or the practice of tyranny by the Indian chieftains.
8 ScOTT, CATHOLIC CoNCEPTIoN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, p. 486.
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b. Charity: Just as individuals are bound to one an-
other by laws of charity because of their common human
nature, so also states are bound by duties of charity because
they are all members of the family of human kind. Thus,
just as individuals ought to aid one another in distress, so
one state ought to come to the aid of another state in its hour
of need. This conception of the duties of charity is in direct
opposition to the modern principle of "non-intervention,"
whereby third parties .have no right to interfere in or at-
tempt to regulate the actions of one state in regard to an-
other, no matter what may be the rights and wrongs of these
actions and relations. For, it is just as reasonable to claim
that no state has the right to protect another from unjust
attack as to claim that no individual has the right to protect
another in time of need. Further, another state, by the same
reason, has the right to defend the subjects of a particular
state when their own government is subjecting them to an
intolerable tyranny; or to help another government in over-
coming anarchy and wanton revolution within its borders.
The positive element in international law, namely, that
constituted by particular treaties, is also subject to the pre-
cepts of the natural law, of which the following are impor-
tant. The conditions required for a valid treaty are prac-
tically the same as those which determine the validity of
ordinary contracts, - suitable matter, competent persons,
mutual consent, etc. Naturally, treaties violating the moral
-law are absolutely invalid; e.g., a treaty having for its ob-
ject the unjust subjugation of a particular nation. The ob-
ligations of a state to observe a treaty which has been un-
justly imposed upon it is a difficult ethical question. Some
authorities maintain that all treaties must be kept; for if the
individual states were left ethically free to decide whether
it should be kept, a grave injury would be done to interna-
tional good faith. The majority of Catholic moralists, how-
ever, hold that unjustly imposed agreements which cover
performances and conditions of secondary importance are
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not always obligatory, but the provisions of treaties which
terminate wars are universally binding unless they have
been made under extreme duress and inflict an ,extreme
amount of injustice.
The precepts of International Law given above.are merely.
those that are easily deducible from the first principles of
the Natural Law. Experience and a better understanding
of international relations enable statesmen to determine
more specific precepts that are applicable in varying times
and circumstances. The individual treaties and covenants
between states specify in an even more detailed way certain
rules of action which express the particular policies existing
between these states. Just as in the civil domestic law, In-
ternational Law embraces both precepts of the Natural
Law and also precepts which are found in the Natural Law
only in a general and implicit way.
CONCLUSION
Western Civilization has experienced in the past three
general forms under which international affairs have been
regulated: (1) The pagan empires, culminating in the
Roman, in which the emperor was the supreme law-giver;
(2) The Holy Roman Empire, in which the pope, some-
times alone and sometimes together with the emperor, acted
as the international authority; (3) The practice among the
sovereign nations, after the break-up of the mediaeval em-
pire, of appealing to the pope to act at least as an arbiter in
their disputes. After the Reformation, of course, this last
practice disappeared, and there was left only the Natural
Law to serve as a common standard of conduct for the na-
tions and as a basis for settling disputes. Men like Vitoria,
Suarez, and Grotius formulated the precepts of an Inter-
national Law as based on the Natural Law. In our own day
the attempt to establish a league of nations and a world
court was a vain effort to provide a new means for regulat-
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ing international affairs. The primary reason for the failure
of this attempt undoubtedly is the fact that most of the
nations now refuse to recognize even the Natural Law as a
standard of action which underlies what they call Inter-
national Law. With the break-up of the empire they lost
the emperor; with the break-up of the mediaeval culture
they lost the pope; and now with the collapse of man's faith
in reason itself, they have lost the last basis for common
agreement, the Natural Law.
The empire and the mediaeval period are things of the
past. We cannot, even if we willed it, return to those past
conditions. The modern world has its own role to fill in the
course of history. But, unless Western Civilization is to be
destroyed utterly, the nations must at least make a begin-
ning toward an international reconstruction on the basis of
the Natural Law, that universal moral law that is above the
particular law of any one nation and therefore common to
all of them. The present revolutionary crisis makes such an
attempt appear impossible, but after the present revolution
has either spent itself or has been crushed, the reconstruc-
tion of national and international institutions must be
founded upon the long-forgotten concepts of the Natural
Law, or else be destined to failure. Only on this basis can
a league of nations and a world court be practically effective.
In short, international arbitration in justice can be accom-
plished only when there is a recognized common law upon
which the practical decisions of an international court can
be based.
If the concepts of a Natural Law, objective morality, acts
intrinsically evil, moral obligation, and all the other prin-
ciples which form the basis for the Scholastic doctrine of In-
ternational Law, appear idealistic and ineffective in promot-
ing international peace and good will, it is surely because
they have not and are not being applied. The moral law is
not easy in its demands; but the difficulty of obeying it does
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not render its precepts false or unimportant. The miserable
condition of the world today both nationally and internation-
ally is a sorry indictment of our blind trust in so-called "prac-
tical" methods of an amoral expediency, with immediate
consequences as the only criteribn of their validity. Let us
hope that the peoples of the world and the leaders of its
nations soon begin to realize that there is an objective moral
law and that its precepts of justice and charity must be
obeyed. It should be evident to all that the temporal reward
for observing the law is peace, just as the punishment for its
violation is war.
Richard R. Baker.
Nazareth College, Nazareth, Michigan.
